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SECURITIES REGULATION-Dumping Birnbaum To
Force Analysis Of The Standing Requirement
Under Rule lOb-5-Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corporation
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has expressly declined
to follow Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,' thereby renewing the
21 year old controversy concerning the validity of the so-called
"Birnbaum doctrine." In Birnbaum, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a plaintiff must be either a purchaser or
seller of securities to maintain an action under section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.2 The standing requirement set forth in Birn-
baum was never directly challenged by any circuit until the decision in
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation.3 The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Eason held, "it is not part of the law of this circuit ' 4 that
a plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of securities to obtain'
relief under section 10b of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5, as promul-
gated thereunder.
1. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange ..
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973).
4. Id. at 661.
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In Eason, the plaintiffs were shareholders of Bank Service Corpo-
ration (Bank Service) which purchased the assets of the leasing
division of Dave Waite Pontiac, Inc. (Waite), a Pontiac dealership.
Bank Service issued 7,000 shares of its stock to Waite in return for the
teasing business, and assumed its liabilities. Among the liabilities
assumed were notes payable to General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion (GMAC), the financier of the leased autos. GMAC required, as a
condition to the transfer of the assets to Bank Service, that the share-
holders of Bank Service personally guarantee payment of the existing
obligations, and any future obligations that might arise. Thereafter,
the leasing business became insolvent and Bank Service defaulted on
the notes. GMAC brought an action in state court to recover on the
guarantees.' The plaintiffs counterclaimed for rescission of their
guarantees, and brought an action in federal court seeking rescission
and damages under section 10b and rule lOb-5. The complaint al-
leged misrepresentation of material facts in inducing the sale of the
leasing business in exchange for the securities. The district court6
held that the corporation, not the shareholders, was the seller 7 of the
securities. The court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action, citing Birn-
baum.' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit substantiated its departure
from Birnbaum by focusing on three areas of analysis: (1) the stand-
ing question; (2) the current status of the case law relating to the
scope of the purchaser-seller definition; and (3) the policy arguments
proffered as a basis for continuing Birnbaum's longevity.
The court concluded that (1) the purchaser-seller requirement is
not a valid limitation in resolving questions of standing; (2) the ex-
tension of the definition of purchasers and sellers to include persons
who are not in fact purchasers or sellers is tantamount to an implied
refusal to follow Birnbaum; and (3) the policy arguments presented
for retaining Birnbaum are at best speculative and unpersuasive.9
The Eason decision, if followed by the Supreme Court"0 will no doubt
5. The state action was subsequently stayed pending resolution of the federal ques-
tion in the federal courts.
6. No. IP 71-C-613 (S.D. Ind. June 20, 1972).
7. Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960). This
case was the first to hold that a corporation, in the issuance of its stock, is a seller of
securities within the meaning of the Birnbaum limitation.
8. No. IP 71-C-613 (S.D. Ind. June 20, 1972).
9. 490 F.2d at 657-60.
10. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari, GMAC v. Eason, 94 S. Ct. 1979
(1974). However, the Court has recently decided to rule on the purchaser-seller issue
by granting certiorari in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores, 43 U.S.L.W. 3273
(U.S. Nov. 12, 1974). The court of appeals decision appears at 492 F.2d 136 (9th
Cir. 1974).
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result in the disappearance of the Birnbaum doctrine with all its at-
tendant difficulties. The importance of Eason must be viewed in the
light of prior case law and commentary pertaining to the standing
question, the Birnbaum doctrine, and Brinbaum's underlying rationale.
Because the court's topical breakdown is a logical one, it is conve-
niently adopted.
STANDING
Two fundamental principles were expressed in Birnbaum: (1) a
plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to have standing
to sue under section 10b and rule lOb-5 (the procedural ruling); 1 and
(2) rule 1 Ob-5 will not support a cause of action where the fraud
alleged is a ,breach of fiduciary duty or corporate mismanagement (the
substantive ruling).' 2  The Superintendent of Insurance of New
York V. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.' 3 case substantially modified
the substantive ruling by holding that some types of corporate mis-
management, notwithstanding the existence of an adequate state rem-
edy, are within the scope of rule 10b-5, if the fraud alleged is more
than tangential to the purchase or sale of securities.' 4 The controversy
rekindled' 5 by Eason, however, concerns the standing issue resolved in
Birnbaum-that a plaintiff must .be a purchaser or seller of securities
to bring an action under section lOb and rule 1Ob-5.
The Birnbaum court found support for the purchaser-seller limita-
tion in the espoused purpose of the S.E.C. in promulgating the rule.'"
The motivation for the adoption of rule 10b-5 was the fact that sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 extended protection from fraud
only to purchasers of securities.'" It was not illegal, under the 1933
11. 193 F.2d at 463.
12. Id. at 464.
13. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
14. Id. at 12. For an excellent analysis of the vitality of the substantive ruling inlight of Bankers Life, see Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsidered, 4 Loyola U.
CG. L.J. 47 (1973).
15. The controversy generated by Birnbaum has precipitated voluminous commen-
tary. See generally Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L.
REv. 543 (1971); Macey, Protection of Creditors' Rights through Use of Rule 10b-5,
76 CoM. LJ. 133 (1971); Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where
Standing to Sue Under Rule l0b-5 is Involed, 20 BuFF. L. REV. 93 (1970); Bloomen-
thal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15
N.Y.LF. 332 (1969);.Lowenfels, Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Patrick, Rule lob-5 Equitable Fraud in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 21 ALA. L REV.. 457 (1969); Fleischer, Federal Corporation
Law: An Assessment, 78 H~Av. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Lowenfels, Rule 10b-5 and the
Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND. L. REV. 893 (1965).
16. 193 F.2d at 463, citing SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
17. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
23Z
Vol. 6: 230
Case Comments
Act at that time, for a purchaser to defraud a seller. The Commis-
sion adopted rule 1Ob-5 for the express purpose of closing this loop-
hole and to extend protection from fraud to sellers as well as pur-
chasers of securities.18 The Commission copied the language of sec-
tion 17(a) of the 1933 Act in drafting rule 1Ob-5 with the substitu-
tion of "any person" in place of "the purchaser," and with the addi-
tion of "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 9
The story of lOb-5's casual origin is best told by the recollection of
Milton Freeman, an S.E.C. staff attorney at the time.
It was one day in the year 1943 [1942], I believe. I was
sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I
received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of
the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been
on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Re-
gional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the
president of some company in Boston who is going around buying
up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00
a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing
very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quad-
rupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there
anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called
in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at
Section 17 [1933 Act], and I put them -together, and the only
discussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase
or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in in-
terstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser (emphasis
added).
18. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), reads as follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a
rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securi-
ties. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities
applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the
protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting indi-
viduals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their
purchase. The text of the Commission's action follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, deeming it necessary for the exer-
cise of the functions vested in it and necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors so to do, pursuant to authority con-
ferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, particularly Sections
10(b) and 23(A) thereof, hereby adopts the following Rule X-10b-5 ...
(emphasis added). For the text of the rule, see note 2 supra.
19. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
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We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who
said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is
how it happened. 20
The appellants in Birnbaum argued that the congressional history
demonstrated that the broad purpose of the Act was to protect all in-
vestors from exploitation by corporate insiders, and that to limit stand-
ing to purchasers and sellers was too narrow an interpretation to ef-
fectuate that purpose. The court, nonetheless, felt that the S.E.C.'s
enunciated purpose controlled, especially in view of the limited
amount of congressional history available on point.21  This reasoning
is falacious since the purpose of the S.E.C. in promulgating a rule
does not necessarily indicate the congressional intent for enacting the
statute which gave rise to the rule. A reading of the plain language
of section 10b reveals that the Commission was empowered to formu-
late rules and regulations under the section.2 2 However, where a rule
conflicts with the broader congressional intent to protect all ,investors,
the conflict must be resolved in favor of the congressional purpose,
unless the restriction (here, the purchaser-seller limitation) is
grounded in the statute itself. Section 10b does not present the ambi-
guity in its "purchase or sale" language that is present in the rule.
Thus, section 10b lacks the foundation upon which a purchaser-seller
limitation could be engrafted; in fact its straight-forward wording
demonstrates the broad purpose it was intended to encompass and
protect. While the courts are the proper authority to interpret the
rules and regulations of an agency promulgated under a congres-
sional grant, it is inappropriate for the courts to claim that a limita-
tion is congressionally mandated by interpreting an agency rule,
rather than the enabling statute. Reliance upon an agency rule to de-
termine the limits of a statute is particularly tenuous where the Com-
mission did not exhaust its power under section 10b with the promul-
gation of lOb-5.23 In fact, the agency is free to change its basis for,
modify, or add to the rule at any time within the confines of congres-
sional authority, and should not be forever bound by its original pur-
pose in espousing the rule.2 4  The S.E.C.'s opposition to the pur-
20. Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793,
922 (1967).
21. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d at 464. The court noted that con-
gressional intent was not manifest from the available history, and therefore concerned
itself with the rule.
22. For the text of section 10b see note 2 supra.
23. L. Loss, 3 SEcuiRTiEs REGULATION, Ch. 9c, n.87 at 1469 (1961).
24. Id.
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chaser-seller limitation is well-known to the courts through its amicus
curiae briefs. 5  Sometimes, as in Drachman v. Harvey,2" the
S.E.C. gets only a one-line acknowledgment for their efforts:
The Commission urges us to take this opportunity to review
and repudiate the purchaser-seller requirement for 10b-5 actions
which we enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.27
The court went on to decline the invitation. But with the S.E.C. in-
terpretation of the rule clear, the only justification which the courts
can have for retaining the limitation must be grounded in the statute
itself. The cases decided subsequent to Birnbaum have not addressed
themselves to the question of whether the limitation is premised on the
statute or the rule. 28  This is apparently because the "in connection
with the purchase or sale" phrase appears in both section 10b and
rule lOb-5. But the Birnbaum court relied most heavily, if not ex-
clusively, on the S.E.C.'s announced purpose in devising lOb-5. 29  It
is this author's contention that the court's analysis of the purchaser-
seller limitation should be based upon the section, rather than the
agency's initial purpose in adopting the rule.
Little insight into Congress' intent in enacting section 10b can be
garnered from the congressional history since the provision provoked
a paucity of discussion. 0 One comment on the section's purpose was
presented by Thomas G. Corcoran, a member of the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration who helped draft the bill and undertook the responsibility
of explaining it to the House committee. He summed up section 9c
25. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974); Supt. of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1970); Mt. Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1972); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Iroquois Industries Inc.
v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865
(3d Cir. 1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Vine v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. 453 F.2d 722, 738 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. Id. at 738. It would seem to be the obvious solution for the S.E.C. to modify
or rewrite the rule so as to negate the Birnbaum controversy. But in all probability,
the S.E.C. would not want to risk all that it has gained from the court interpretations
of the rule. It is also unclear whether the S.E.C. ever accepted the Birnbaum rule and
then changed its position, or whether, the S.E.C. merely failed to vocalize its opposition
to the limitation in the early years which it is now attempting to make up for through
the frequent use of amicus briefs.
28. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); James v. Ger-
ber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973); Haberman v. Murchian, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir.
1972); Mt. Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Erling
v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970); Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1968).
29. 193 F.2d at 463.
30. Hearings on S. Res. 56, 84 & 97, Before Senafe Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 6624, 6899, 6910, 6936-38, 6988 (1933-34).
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(later renumbered as 10b without substantial modification) of the first
version (H.R. 7852) as-follows:
Subsection (c) says "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning de-
vices. . . ." Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to pre-
Vent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection
to that kind of clause. The Commission should have authority to
deal with new manipulative devices. 31
There were also several unsuccessful attempts to narrow the broad
language of the section by the stock exchanges. Representative of
those attacks are the comments of Eugene E. Thompson, President
of the Associated Stock Exchanges, in his appearance before the House
Hearing:
This section is so vague and inadequate for the purpose it evi-
dently is intended to accomplish that it should be stricken out in its
entirety. To allow it to remain leaves in the hands of the Commis-sion a weapon with which that body might determine that anything
or everything is detrimental to the public interest or to the proper
protection of investors.32
It apppears that Congress addressed itself to a broad anti-fraud ob-
jective in order to arm the S.E.C. with the power to deal with varied
manipulative schemes. This broad remedial purpose is frustrated by
the imposition of the purchaser-seller limitation. If fraud and mis-
representation are the evils Congress sought to correct by enacting
section 10b, would not this purpose be more fully effectuated by al-
lowing all investors who are injured by such fraud to bring an ac-
,tion under lOb-5? Limitations upon access to the courts encourage
the very activity Congress sought to suppress in promulgating the
statute, since the danger exists that inventive potential defendants may
seek to arrange the fraudulent transaction so that the potential plain-
tiffs will not be directly involved in a purchase or sale. Effective as-
sistance in achieving Congress' stated purpose should not be lightly
eliminated through the use of judicial restrictions upon standing.
Bankers Life
Another hurdle to the elimination of the purchaser-seller standing
limitation is the unresolved question of whether or not Bankers Life
ratified the purchaser-seller requirement of Birnbaum.33 In Bankers
31. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on Stock Exchange Regulation, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115
(1934).
32. Id. at 258.
33. Ryan, Bankers Life: Birnbaum Reconsidered, 4 LOYOLA U. Cm. L.J. 47, 59
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum Reconsidered]. Mr. Ryan contends that the Su-
236
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Life, various other defendants agreed with Bankers Life and Casualty
Co. (Bankers Life) to purchase the Manhattan Casualty Co. (Man-
hattan) from it. The defendants obtained a short-term five million
dollar loan without collateral from the Irving Trust Company. The
loan was used to purchase all the stock of Manhattan. The defendants
then caused Manhattan to sell its United States Treasury bonds for
approximately five million dollars which was in turn used to repay
Irving Trust. In brief, the defendants purchased the corporation with
its own assets. The court held that Manhattan was injured as an in-
vestor in its sale of the Treasury bonds notwithstanding the fact that
the fraud arose from insider activity for which an adequate state
remedy existed. 34 Manhattan was held to have a remedy under
lOb-5. The thrust of the decision was to significantly modify the
substantive holding of Birnbaum which denied relief under 1Ob-5 for
fraud perpetrated by insiders where a state remedy existed. Nonethe-
less, it has been argued that the Supreme Court, by making mention
of the fact that Manhattan qualified as a seller of securities,
has adopted the procedural holding of Birnbaum.3 5  The argument
is buttressed by the observation that the Supreme Court had never
explicitly, prior to Bankers Life, 36 recognized a private right of action
under section 10b. Yet, the Court has upheld private actions under
the section without discussion of that particular point.37 The implica-
tion is, that either by silence, or notation of the limitation's existence,
the Court has adopted -the purchaser-seller requirement. It is this writ-
er's contention that the Supreme Court did not in fact acquiesce in the
purchaser-seller limitation by its mere use of the word "seller" to de-
scribe Bankers Life. Acknowledgment that Bankers Life was a seller
is not equivalent to an acceptance of the Birnbaum limitation because
it was not necessary to the holding in the case.
Not only does Bankers Life fail to sanction the purchaser-seller re-
quirement, it affirmatively supports its elimination. The Eason court
noted that the standing limitation arose at a time when lOb-5 was
preme Court, in Bankers Life, impliedly ratified the purchaser-seller limitation of Birn
baum through its repeated use of the term "seller."
34. 404 U.S. at 13. Birnbaum did not specifically address itself to the existence of
a state remedy or its adequacy, but it has been uniformly interpreted as foreclosing ac-
tion a gainst insiders for fraud because of the existence Of -the state remedy.
35. Birnbaum Reconsidered, supra note 33, at 59.
36. 404 U.S. at 14, n.9. While the Supreme Court did not formally recognize the
existence of this right until 1972, it has been unquestioned by the courts since the de-
cision of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the case
in which the question was first presented.
37. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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thought to relate only to public sales of securities, when it would have
been reasonable to assume that it provided protection only to the de-
frauded purchaser or seller.3 8  According to Eason, the Birnbaum
court considered section l0b and rule 1Ob-5 to be substantively lim-
ited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets. 9  A logical
outgrowth of that premise would be Birnbaum's holding that lOb-5
would not support an action where the fraud alleged is a breach of fi-
duciary duty for which a state remedy exists. Because insider mis-
management or fraud does not directly relate to the preservation of
the integrity of the securities markets, the Birnbaum court's opinion
that 10b-5 did not apply logically followed. Consistent with the view
that lOb-5 related only to the securities markets, the purchaser-seller
limitation would then likely have been imposed as a logical means of
effectuating the market integrity principle. With the Supreme Court
in Bankers Life repudiating the substantive holding in Birnbaum,
thereby destroying the premise that 1Ob-5 is limited to preserving the
integrity of the securities markets, would not the raison d'etre of the
purchaser-seller limitation, originally conceived to implement that pol-
icy, fall as well? The overruling of the substantive holding in Birn-
baum clearly undercuts the continued existence of the procedural
holding.
Constitutional Aspects of Standing
Whether or not a mandate for the purchaser-seller limitation de-
rives from the language of section 10b itself must be considered even
if the congressional history did not compel it, and the Supreme Court
did not consider it:
It shall be unlawful for any person .. to use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . for
the protection of investors.40
This section is directed at what the defendant may not do. Its only
reference to plaintiffs is to state that the statute's general purpose is to
protect investors. However, it is obvious that an investor can be de-
38. 490 F.2d at 658.
39. This conclusion comes from the Second Circuit's discussion of lOb-5's purpose
in Supt. of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970),
wherein the court stated at 361: "§ 10b is limited to preserving the integrity of the se-
curities markets." Also pursuing this reasoning is Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
238
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frauded without direct involvement in a purchase or sale. The facts of
Birnbaum illustrate this fact. The minority shareholders of Newport
Steel Corporation were defrauded when the controlling shareholder
refused an attractive merger offer that would have benefited all share-
holders, in favor of a collusive oppotunity to sell only his own shares
at a substantial premium. The buyer then used his controlling position
to supply steel to himself at favorable prices, at a time when the de-
mand for steel far exceeded its supply. 41 The plaintiffs were denied
standing to sue since the fraud did not occur in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities even though the plaintiffs, as sharehold-
ers, incurred a monetary loss.
It is apparent that the purchaser-seller limitation arose from the lan-
guage of the rule, not the statute. It has been maintained earlier that
the court's reliance on the rule was error.42 Nonetheless, for pur-
poses of analysis, it will be assumed that the rule was the proper
place to seek congressional intent. The rule provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to engage in any act,
practice or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security. 43
This language was impliedly construed by the Birnbaum court in such
a fashion that the "in connection with the purchase or sale" language
modified the latter reference to "any person." That construction,
coupled with a strict interpretation of the phrase "in connection with"
resulted in the court's finding that the potential plaintiff had to be ei-
ther a purchaser or seller to sue under the rule. There are two signifi-
cant errors in this interpretation. The first is that the Supreme Court
in Bankers Life construed the "in connection with " language liberally,
holding that the alleged fraud need only "touch" the purchase or
sale. 44  Therefore, the purchase or sale need only touch the potential
plaintiff, and that would seem to require something less than pur-
chaser or seller status, i.e., injury in fact to an investor. Second, the
language of lOb-5 has not been held to require that the defendant en-
gage in a purchase or sale -in order to be found liable.45  The fraud
41. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d at 462.
42. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
43. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
44. 404 U.S. at 13.
45. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). In Heit, the plaintiffs purchased
debentures in reliance upon a false annual report. When sued, the insiders maintained
that plaintiffs lacked standing under lOb-5 because the defendants had not engaged in
the purchase or sale of any security. The court construed section 10b and rule lOb-
5 broadly stating there was no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by
239
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need only occur in connection with a purchase or sale, and the defend-
ant himself need not be engaged in a purchase or sale. Thus, the
"in connection with" language in lOb-5 has been construed broadly
when the analysis is undertaken from the standpoint of the defendant's
liability, but has been narrowly construed in connection with the plain-
tiff.
As discussed above, neither the congressional history, the statute, the
rule, nor the Supreme Court decision compelled the application of the
purchaser-seller requirement. If a standing limitation is deemed nec-
essary by the courts to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the appropri-
ate test of standing is imposed by the Constitution. The Constitution
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to "cases" and "controver-
sies."4 6  This "standing" concept permits adjudication only when the
dispute is in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of judicial resolution.47
The gist of the question of standing . . . [is whether the party
seeking relief has] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharp-
ens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de-
pends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions?48
In other words, "the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particu-
lar issue and not whether -the issue itself is justiciable. ' '49  In 1970, the
Supreme Court, in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp,5" announced a two-pronged test for -the determination
of standing. The first element of the test requires the plaintiff to al-
lege that the actions he complains of have caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise. 5  The second element requires that "the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or con-
stitutional guarantee in question."52  In other words, to afford a plain-
tiff standing under the statute, the statute must be debatably designed
to redress the particular injury which the plaintiff has incurred. In
insiders or the corporation itself, in order to be held liable under the rule. See also
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
46. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2.
47. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
48. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
49. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 99.
50. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
51. Id. at 152.
52. Id. at 153. Dissenting Justices Brennan and White were of the opinion that the
second element of the test was "wholly unnecessary and inappropriate," because a deter-
mination of standing, they felt, should not be predicated on the merits of the complaint.
Id. at 169.
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applying the first element of the -test in Eason, Judge Stevens ob-
served that either plaintiff or defendant would suffer a loss of three
hundred thousand dollars as a result of the outcome of the litigation,
and held that such a large monetary loss would sufficiently sharpen
the issues in satisfaction of the constitutional requirement."3 On the
second element, the court cited Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,54
which was the first case to hold that a civil action could be main-
tained under section 10b and rule lOb-5. In Kardon, Judge Kirk-
patrick held that an action could be brought by a member of the
class "for whose special benefit the statute was enacted."55  Judge
Stevens, deciding that 10b was designed to protect all persons "who,
in their capacity as investors, suffer significant injury as a direct con-
sequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction," ruled
that Eason, as a guarantor, was within the class sought to be pro-
tected by the statute.5 6
The two-element test espoused in the Data Processing case is
broad enough to encompass the remedial purposes of the Act, yet
narrow enough to require an examination of the merits of the plain-
tiff's claim to determine if the fraud touches the purchase or sale
of securities. Moreover, the demise of the purchaser-seller limitation,
coupled with the adoption of the constitutional approach to standing,
is consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition relative to the per-
spective to be adopted in construing the 1934 Act: "form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality."5
DIFFERENCE OR SEMANTICS?
The definition of what constitutes a purchaser or seller within the
meaning of the Birnbaum doctrine is not what might conceptually be
expected. The court in Herpich v. Wallace18 stated its current
status and rationale thusly:
We do not say that only those who are purchasers or sellers in
the "strict comon law traditional sense" . . . may maintain an
action for damages under Rule .b-5..... In deciding whether a
plaintiff has standing, we search for what will best establish the
congressional purpose. . . . Thus we construe the "in connection
53. Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d at 657. Although the court apparently applied the
two-pronged test enunciated in Data Processing, the case was not expressly mentioned.
54. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
55. Id. at 514.
56. 490 F.2d at 659.
57. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
58. 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
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with the purchase or sale of any security" clause found in both the
section and the rule broadly and flexibly to effectuate that pur-
pose. . . . The "purchaser"-"seller" standing requirement is to be
similarly construed. . . so that the broad design of the section and
the rule is not frustrated by the use of novel or atypical trans-
actions. 59
Those instances in which the courts have considered the plaintiff to be
a purchaser or seller are indeed novel under the factual situations pre-
sented. The courts have continually eroded the limitation in determin-
ing what constitutes a purchaser or seller olthough purporting to follow
Birnbaum. A review of the cases embracing distortions and expan-
sions of the purchaser-seller concept follows, for the purpose of es-
tablishing the extent of erosion and circumvention of the rule.
In several cases, the courts have determined that a corporation has
standing as a purchaser and/or seller where a corporate sale, acqui-
sition or merger occurs. In Hooper v. Mountain States Securities
Corp.,6 0 a corporation was defrauded into issuing 700,000 dollars
worth of stock for assets of negligible value. The court held that a
corporation's issuance of securities in return for assets or money is not
unlike a sale of securities, and held that such a transaction satisfied the
Birnbaum requirement. In SEC v. National Securities Inc.,"1 National
made a successful tender offer to the shareholders of the target corpo-
ration. However, the offeror corporation failed to advise the share-
holders of the offeree corporation that assets of the offeree corpora-
tion were to be used to assist in payment of the acquisition. The court
held that it was as though the shareholders of the offeree corporation
had sold their shares for cash and then used the money from the sale
to purchase shares in the offeror corporation. The exchange of
shares was found to be equivalent to a purchase within the meaning
of section 10b and rule lOb-5. The Seventh Circuit, in Dasho v. Sus-
quehanna Corp.,6 - extended the National holding by determining that
the surviving corporation in a merger is both a purchaser and a seller
of securities within the rule, and noted the result is the same where a
sale of assets for securities takes place followed by a liquidation of the
selling corporation. The factual situation in Dasho is almost the con-
verse of National. Here, the merger occurred when insiders in the of-
feror corporation, overvalued the offeree corporation to secure profit
for themselves arising out of their ownership interests in the offeree cor-
59. Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted).
60. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
61. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
62. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
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poration. The offeror corporation, as a result of its bargain, purchased
435,000 shares of its own stock held by the offeree corporation for al-
most two million dollars in excess of its fair market value. Again, the
court found that the plaintiff had achieved the status of purchaser and
seller.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Vine v. Beneficial Fi-
nance Co., 3 conceived the "forced-seller" doctrine as another method
to avoid the Birnbaum doctrine. In Vine, the plaintiff was character-
ized as a seller of securities even though no actual sale took place.
Through misrepresentation, insiders of the offeror corporation obtained
95 per cent of the stock of the offeree corporation in a tender
offer. Under Delaware law, holding stock in that percentage permits
the holder to effectuate a short-form merger. 4 The plaintiff in Vine
was one of the squeezed-out shareholders whose only recourse in such
a merger is the right to the appraisal value of his stock from the sur-
viving corporation. The court found a constructive sale, with the
plaintiff a constructive or forced seller. The court stated that where
a shareholder's investment is changed from an interest in a going en-
terprise to a right solely to the payment of money, he should be treated
as a seller and permitted standing to complain of the fraud that re-
sulted in the sale.
Two cases decided by the Second Circuit in 1969 demonstrate how
the application of the forced-seller doctrine, with its ambiguities and
uncertainties, can achieve incongruous results through its inconsistent
application by the courts. In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China
Corp.,65 a tender offer was frustrated by insiders of the target corpo-
ration who misrepresented facts to their shareholders in order to dis-
courage them from tendering their shares. Consequently, the tender
offer failed. Although the offeror obtained a substantial number of
shares, it did not obtain working control, which it desired. The plain-
tiff sought to meet the Birnbaum standard by reason of the purchase
of the shares it had acquired in the tender offer. The court held that
the plaintiff was not defrauded in the shares it purchased, but rather
was defrauded in the shares it was unable to purchase. Hence there
was no fraud in connection with a purchase and no resultant standing
to sue. The facts in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.66 are
63. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
64. A short form merger permits the corporation holding the stock to merge the cor-
poration whose stock is held into the holding corporation without the consent of the re-
maining shareholders.
65. 417 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1969).
66. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
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substantially similar to Iroquois with these variations: First, instead
of the target corporation, Westinghouse, engaging in the misrepresen-
tation, it sought and obtained a friendly merger partner, Standard,
who engaged in the alleged fraud. Second, the stock which the offeror
gained in its unsuccessful tender offer, was the subject of a forced
sale (divestiture) under threat of an antitrust suit, as both Crane and
Standard were engaged in the manufacture of plumbing fixtures. The
Second Circuit held that Crane had standing to sue because of its
later forced sale, even though the later sale was not the sale touched
by fraud. In fact, a profit of several million dollars was made. The
fraud occurred in both Iroquois and Crane when the purchaser was un-
able to obtain shares that it desired because of the alleged misrepre-
sentations. Consistency would require that Crane be denied standing
under the logic of Iroquois, since in Crane the subsequent forced sale
was not -touched by the fraud. The Second Circuit supported its ra-
tionale in Crane by focusing on the Vine test, later summarized by the
Fifth Circuit in Dudley v. Southeastern Factor and Finance Corp.:
Vine's informing principle, carried forward in Crane, is that a
shareholder should be treated as a seller when the nature of his
investment has been fundamentally changed from an interest in a
going enterprise into a right solely to a payment of money for his
shares.68
The Iroquois and Crane cases highlight the type of problems which
courts may encounter when attempting to analyze fact situations
through the amgibuities of the purchaser-seller rule. The Second Cir-
cuit, in its adherence to Vine, undercut its own logic in Iroquois when
it decided Crane."9 If -the cases had been approached from the stand-
point of the constitutional requirements for standing to sue, the forced
seller doctrine would never -have been developed. The court would
have recognized that the plaintiff in Iroquois and Crane had suffered
injury in fact in its attempted securities purchases which section 10b
was enacted to protect. As previously noted, the facts of 'the Crane
case were identical to Iroquois with the exception of -the antitrust im-
plications. Thus, the standing requirement would be met under the
constitutional analysis in both cases.
A further extension of the purchaser-seller definition was enunciated
in A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,70 which conceived the aborted pur-
67. 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971)..
68. Id. at 307.
69. Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Un-
der Rule 10b-5 is Involved, 20 BuFF. L. REv. 93 (1971).
70. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
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chaser-seller doctrine. In that case, a customer ordered his broker
to purchase stock for him with the intent to pay for it only if the value
of the stock increased by the time the time payment was due. The
court held that the customer's order to his broker was a contract of
purchase by -the customer, consequently the broker was a seller within
the meaning of the Birnbaum rule and had standing to sue under
lOb-5.
The Sixth Circuit, in James v. Gerber Products Cp.,71 purported to
follow Birnbaum and merely add another extension to the purchaser-
seller definition. In fact, the court's analysis refutes Birnbaum and
supports -the Eason approach. In Gerber, a bank was the trustee of a
testamentary trust, that happened to have officers of the Gerber
Products Co. (Gerber) on its board. The plaintiff's trust contained
substantial holdings of Gerber stock. A sale Was arranged to Gerber
of 15,000 shares of the stock from the trust at the closing price on the
New York Stock Exchange on the day of the sale. At the time, the
market price of Gerber was depressed well below its actual value, a
fact then unknown to the market at large. The plaintiff alleged that
inside information on the part of the Gerber representatives insti-
gated the sale. The court held that the beneficiary, as the real party
in interest, should be considered the seller and given standing to sue,
stating:
As beneficiary, she was the person who was to be benefited by the
sale and thus she had the interests of a de facto seller ...
[S]eparating the legal and beneficial incidents of ownership in
the property is a mere technical argument since there is only one
interest at stake and that is the beneficiary's.72
The court also observed that rule lOb-5 was designed to protect
against a wide variety of deceptive activities in securities transactions
without regard to. the limitations of a common law action for fraud.
Although Gerber purported to apply the Birnbaum doctrine, it pre-
sented a cogent argument for abandoning Birnbaum's rationale. First,
although a state remedy existed, the court permitted the plaintiff-bene-
ficiary standing to sue. Second, and most important, the court. held
that the plaintiff was the real party in interest, and as such, should
have standing to sue. -In short, labels should not control the determi-
nation of standing. 73 The court's logic is equally applicable to share-
71. 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at.948-49.
73. See also Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (beneficial share-
holders in debenture redemption plan); Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241
(5th Cir. 1971 ) (trustee-in-bankruptcy).
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holders of a corporation, who as a result of the Birnbaum rule, do
not have standing to sue in their own right if the sale giving rise to the
fraud is transacted by the corporation. Although shareholders do have
the right to sue derivatively on behalf of their corporation,7 4 many
times, such as in Eason, that right is of no value when the misrepre-
sentation results in an action directly against the shareholder so that
he is unable to interpose the corporation to obtain standing deriva-
tively."5 The courts permit a corporation to bring an action for fraud
under 1Ob-5 when it participates in a purchase or sale. The result
should not be different when the real party in interest, the shareholder,
seeks to bring an action in his own behalf when the fraud has been
perpetrated upon the corporation, and has caused injury in fact to
the shareholder in his capacity as an investor.
The final line of cases illustrate the exception to, rather than an ex-
tension of, the purchaser-seller limitation. In these cases, the courts
permit injunctive relief to plaintiffs who are not purchasers or sellers
by stressing -the dissimilarity between damage and injunctive actions.
In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,7 6 the defendant, after obtain-
ing control of the Kress Company, depressed the dividends of the cor-
poration to facilitate purchase of the remaining outstanding stock at
reduced prices. The court held -that since the plaintiff had not yet
sold his stock, he lacked standing to sue for damages because he was
not yet a seller. However, the court held that the plaintiff could sue for
injunctive relief because the complaint alleged a manipulative scheme
that still continued. The court stated:
[T]he claim for damages . . . founders both on proof of loss
and the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule;
on the other hand, the claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these
issues . . . 77
This remark by the Second Circuit may give some insight into a pos-
sible purpose of the courts in sustaining the Birnbaum limitation. It
suggests that the purchaser-seller limitation is continually reaffirmed
not because of a statutory mandate, but rather as a device to avoid
problems of proof. Another leading case which permits injunctive re-
lief to one not a purchaser or seller is Kahan v. Rosenstiel.78  The de-
74. Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 824 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. In Eason, GMAC was able to avoid action against the corporation by suing the
shareholders directly on their personal guarantees.
76. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
77. Id. at 547.
78. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970); see, e.g., Britt v. The Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d
433 (6th Cir. 1969); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970); Vincent v.
Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
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fendant was the controlling stockholder of the Schenley Corporation,
who sold his stock at a premium to the Glen-Alden Corporation. Glen-
Alden then made a tender offer for the remaining outstanding shares
of Schenley, representing that the tender was equal in value to the
amount per share paid to Rosenstiel. Plaintiff was a non-tendering
shareholder who alleged that the offer of Glen-Alden did not approxi-
mate the Rosenstiel bargain, and charged misrepresentation and
fraud. The court said, in granting equitable relief:
Neither the language of § 10b and Rule 10b-5 nor the policy
they were designed to effectuate mandate adherence to a strict
purchaser-seller requirement so as to preclude suits for relief if a
plaintiff can establish a causal connection between the violations
alleged and plaintiff's loss.7 9
The courts in the injunction-plaintiff cases, in pursuing a causation
approach, look to the relation of the plaintiff to the defendant, not
the title of either party, as their primary analytical tool. 0 In other
words, these decisions permit the real party in interest to bring suit
for equitable relief if such party can demonstrate a causal connection
between the fraud alleged and the injury suffered. This analysis is
applicable to damage actions as well as injunctive suits. In permitting
the injunctive remedy, the courts are acknowledging that the plaintiff
is being damaged by the defendant. It seems incongruous to permit
a plaintiff to prevent future damage, yet deny him recovery for dam-
age already suffered.
The trend of the decisions which deviated from the Birnbaum ra-
tionale was summarized by the Ninth Circuit in Mount Clemens Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Bell:"'
These allegations clearly reveal that appellants never actually
purchased or sold the Missle stock. Yet that circumstance does not
end our inquiry, for under the liberal interpretation that has some-
times attended the application of the Birnbaum doctrine, there
have been cases in which standing has been afforded to persons
who, even though not actual purchasers or sellers, have been
deemed to have the required status.8 2
Echoing the Ninth Circuit, Judge Stevens remarked in Eason that,
"[Tlhe course of judicial decision since 1952, when Birnbaum was
decided, has actually recognized that the class of protected persons is
79. 424 F.2d at 173.
80. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari, at 11, GMAC v. Eason, 416
U.S. 960 (1974).
81. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
82. Id. at 345.
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broader than merely purchasers 'and sellers.18 3  The brief for -respon-
dents in opposition to certiorari in Eason stated:
Some circuits, like the Second, Third, and Fifth, purport to ac-
cept the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation, but then extend
lOb-5 protection by treating persons as purchasers and sellers
even though they are not. . . . Other circuits, like the Eighth,
Ninth and Tenth are moving toward a causational approach. The
recent decisions of the Sixth and Seventh circuits look more to the
purpose of Rule lOb-5 and the class of persons to be protected by
the Rule. To a circuit, however, the answer to the question
. ..is the same. Persons who are neither purchasers nor sellers
of securities are allowed to maintain lOb-5 actions.84
It has been demonstrated that the broad remedial purpose of the Act
can prevail when the court so desires. Any difference between the
cases reviewed and Eason is in the semantics of the rationale, not in
the result. Eason, unlike its predecessors, in refusing to accept the pur-
chaser-seller requirement, adopts an analysis which does not look to
who the plaintiff is in providing a remedy for fraud under 10b-5.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The respondents in Eason raised two policy arguments before the
Seventh Circuit in their unsuccessful quest to have the Birnbaum limi-
tation upheld. The first contention was that removal of ,the purchaser-
seller limitation would unleash an unmanageable flood of litigation. 5
The second objection was that the court, if it refused to follow Birn-
baum, would not be preserving national consistency in the interpreta-
tion of federal securities legislation.86
On the first point, the petitioner's brief for certiorari quotes Judge
Stevens supposition in Eason that even if 6"complete abandonment
of Birnbaum will significantly increase our workload" it is not suf-
ficient justification to reject what the court believes to be "a correct
interpretation of the statute. '8 7 The brief goes on to argue:
Without question, the practical impact of any particular interpre-
tation of a statute is not a relevant consideration in the process of
statutory interpretation, the exclusive purpose of which is to de-
83. 490 F.2d at 659.
84. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari, at 14, GMAC v. Eason, 416
U.S. 960 (1974).
85. 490 F.2d at 660.
86. Id. The continuing validity of this argument may be laid to rest in Manor Drug
Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Nov.
12, 1974).
87. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 17, GMAC v. Eason, 416 U.S. 960 (1974),
citing Eason v. GMAC, 490 F.2d at 660.
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termine -the intent of Congress in enacting the statute in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, the practical impact of the interpretation
adopted. . . is certainly a highly relevant consideration in assessing
the importance of the decision below.18
If the practical impact of a decision is irrelevant to a court construing
a statute, then such considerations should not be relevant to a review-
ing court, simply because the reviewing court is in fact interpreting
the statute anew. Arguably, the practical impact of the statute may
be relevant, but only to the extent Congress considered it when enact-
ing the statute. The anticipation of Congress in evaluating the stat-
ute's consequences is pertinent to its intent in promulgating the stat-
ute. However, where the congressional history is devoid of any com-
ment on the anticipated effect, the court should defer to the purpose
conveyed by the statute in its determination regardless of the number
of persons enfranchised. The Eason court, however, utilized a differ-
ent approach:
The extent to which a refusal to adhere to Birnbaum will affect
that volume is really a matter of speculation. . . . The number of
parties who may invoke Rule lOb-5 without the purchaser-seller
limitation may not differ materially from the number who would
recover by persuading a court to interpret the purchaser-seller con-
cept flexibily.8 9
The second policy consideration presented in Eason also lacks per-
suasive force. The argument is made that the purchaser-seller stand-
ing limitation should not be overruled in order to preserve national
consistency in the interpretation of federal securities legislation. The
petitioner's brief quotes Blau v. Leheman:90
Congress can and might amend [the Act] if the Commission would
present to it the policy arguments it has presented to us, but
we think that Congress is the proper agency to change an interpre-
tation of the Act unbroken since its passage, if the change is to be
made.91
The argument might have force if there was a substantial difference
in the outcome of cases involving the purchaser-seller question as a
consequence of the Seventh Circuit decision. The difference between
Eason and the cases purporting to follow Birnbaum is primarily se-
mantic, reflecting the fact that the exceptions and extensions to the
standing limitation largely envelop the rule. In addition, it was only
88. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
89. 490 F.2d at 660.
90. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 10, GMAC v. Eason, 416 U.S. 960 (1974),
citing Blau v. Leheman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1962).
91. 368 U.S. at 413.
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2 years earlier that the Supreme Court substantially modified the
substantive ruling of the Birnbaum decision in Bankers Life without di-
recting the proponents of change to seek their remedy in Congress.
That interpretation of the Act had also been unbroken for 20
years prior to the Supreme Court's decision to modify it. Since the
Court was able to change the substantive ruling of Birnbaum, there is
little reason why it is unable to change the procedural ruling as well.
Finally, Judge Stevens concluded in the Eason opinion -that the con-
torversy surrounding consistency of interpretation of securities legisla-
tion is exaggerated:
We are inclined to think that the extent of the consistency in ap-
plying Birnbaum is overstated and is less important than an inde-
pendent appraisal of an important issue arising in an area of the
law which, despite the age of the statute, is still in an embryonic
stage of development. 92
Another policy consideration of considerable importance is the fact
that the dramatic growth of securities law coverage of the past two
decades, primarily under rule 1Ob-5, has created a burgeoning fed-
eral corporation law. In commenting upon the court construction of
section l0b of the 1934 Act, the court in McClure v. Borne Chemical
Co., Inc.93 said:
That Act deals with the protection of investors, primarily stock-
holders. It creates many managerial duties and liabilities un-
known at common law. It expresses Federal interest in manage-
ment-stockholder relationships which theretofore had been al-
most exclusively the concern of the states. Section 10(b) im-
poses broad fiduciary duties on management viz-A-viz the corpora-
tion and its individual stockholders. As implemented by Rule
10b-5 . . . Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent
weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties. It can be fairly
said that the Exchange Act of which Section 10(b) [is a part] ...
constitutes far reaching federal substantive corporation law. 94
The growth of federal corporate law has evolved as a result of the fail-
ure of state corporate statutes to provide adequate protection for the
needs and interests of stockholders and other investors. Judge
Learned Hand recognized the basis for the growth of federal corpo-
ration law when he observed that the undesirable and conceptualistic
state law construction of fiduciary principles as applied to corporate
insiders in securities -transactions creates "a grave omission in our cor-
92. 490 F.2d at 661.
93. 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
94. Id. at 834.
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porate law."95 Professor Stanley A. Kaplan pointed to the state's fail-
ure to curb the wide latitude given to corporations-a practice detri-
mental to the shareholder's well-being:
In states such as Illinois, Delaware and New York, and states
which have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act, the
basic theory of the statutes, in effect, is to set up enabling provi-
sions to permit a corporation to act with considerable freedom, to
forbid only certain egregious improprieties and to require only
certain specified shareholder protection.96
Again, the states have not yet learned their lesson, that abdication of
their responsibility to the public, either as a result of the efforts of
special interest groups or otherwise, will encourage the osmotic entry
of the federal government to fill the void which the absence of state
action creates, whether judicially or legislatively.
Commentators have disagreed with respect to the desirability of the
expansion of federal interests in corporate activities.9 7  It seems unde-
niable that the states have a vested interest in providing liberal cor-
poration laws in order to compete for the corporate franchise taxes.
This interest conflicts with interests of shareholder protection. 8 As
the states have utilized such an approach, adequate protection of the
shareholders' interests has defaulted to the federal government result-
ing in the expansion of the existing federal securities law.
Elimination of the purchaser-seller requirement will remove perhaps
the last major barrier to shareholder redress in the federal courts for
fraud perpetrated upon shareholders and corporations by other corpo-
rations and insiders. The Supreme Court in Bankers Life removed
from corporate insiders, the cloak of privilege from federal action that
Birnbaum had draped about them on the grounds that an adequate
state remedy existed. 99 While Bankers Life did not address itself to
the adequacy of the state remedy, it would be fair to infer that had an
adequate state remedy 'been in fact available, there would have been
no need for the Supreme Court to provide a federal remedy. Removal
of the purchaser-seller limitation will perfect the availability of a fed-
95. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951).
96. Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAW. 868, 869
(1963).
97. Bahlrnan, Rule lob-5: The Case for Its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation
Law, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 727 (1968); Hankel, Codification-Civil Liability Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 866 (1967); Painter, Inside Information: Grow-
ing Pains in the Development of Federal Corporate Law Under Rule lob-5, 65 COLUM.
L REV. 1361 (1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corpor-
ations by Implication Through Rule lob-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964).
98. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 92-95, at 131 (2d ed. 1970).
99. See note 34 supra.
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eral remedy for corporate shareholders whose current state remedy is
still far from satisfactory.
Three other policy considerations emerge in the cases and com-
mentary which should, so it is maintained, bar the abandonment of
the Birnbaum limitation: (1) the difficulty of determining causation
between the plaintiff's injury .and the fraud alleged; 10 (2) the diffi-
culty of determining damages where no purchase or sale takes place
by the plaintiff;' 01 and (3) the potential for unlimited liability when
many persons are adversely affected by the fraud alleged. 10 2 The dif-
ficulty with the first two arguments is that there are established areas
of the law that deal with these particular problems. The law of torts
has innumerable cases on the subject of causation and proximate
cause.'0 3 Similarly, the law of damages has established methods for
the determination of damages, even where assessment is difficult.0 4
The complexity of determining causation and damages should not be
the rationale employed .to deny an injured party access to the courts.
On the question of liability, if section 10b's purpose is to prevent
manipulation and fraud, then overwhelming liability imposed upon
those who persist in utilizing fraudulent methods, will go farther than
criminal sanctions in correcting the abuses the Act was designed to
remedy. Further, either liability exists or it does not in a specific
case. The determination of the existence of such liability should not
be based upon the possibility that the liability may be extensive.
In sum, Lewis Lowenfels perhaps best articulates the policy reasons
for the elimination of Birnbaum:
The infinite variety of problems which the courts are called upon
to consider, the many varieties and complexities of fraud which are
possible in contemporary securities markets, the ingenuity of poten-
tial wrongdoers-all argue strongly against having any rigid, inflexi-
ble judicial requirement other than the presence of the fraud itself
as a sine qua non of the right to sue. If such a rigid doctrine is
permitted to exist, clever men will always find ways to perpetrate
their wrongdoings without incurring liability. 10 5
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the purchaser-seller limitation was engrafted on
100. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
101. Id.
102. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970), citing R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968).
103. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
104. J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES § 1171 at 4388 et seq. (4th ed. 1916).
105. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5,
54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
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section 10b via rule 1Ob-5. As a result, a statutory standing require-
ment was created where it had not previously existed. The restriction
excluded from remedy many plaintiffs who were victims of misrepre-
sentation and manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, merely because they failed to be directly involved in the
fraudulent purchase or sale. Authority for the standing qualification
could not be found in the scant congressional history available on sec-
tion 10b. Although there was no evidence of any intended restriction
upon plaintiffs, the congressional hearings indicated a broad anti-
fraud purpose which eventually manifested itself in the language of
section 10b. However, the Birnbaum court imposed the restriction in
its construction of the rule, pointing to the S.E.C.'s announced pur-
pose at the time of the rule's inception. If a permanent obstacle is to
be placed in the path of potential plaintiffs seeking remedy from fraud
pursuant to the securities acts, then the limitation should be predicated
upon the statute, not in the rule.
Even if the limitation is properly founded in the agency's rule, then
the well delineated position of the S.E.C. over the past decade in op-
position to the limitation, should be granted a degree of deference by
the courts. The agency's current position should control to the extent
that its interpretation does not exceed the parameters of statutory au-
thority. The sole standing requirement should be dictated by the
Constitution: an injury in fact which the statute proposes to rem-
edy. Such an 'approach would further Congress' intent by protecting
investors from fraud rather than scrutinizing the investor to ascertain
if he qualifies under a contrived standing requirement not relevant
to the fraud alleged. Injury to the plaintiff, not his position in the
transaction, should control access to the courts.
All of the circuits subscribe to one or more of -three basic viewpoints
in their ostensibly unanimous opposition to the Seventh Circuit's
stance in Eason. These viewpoints can be roughly categorized as the
(1) constructive, (2) causation, and (3) purpose approaches to
standing. The constructive approach adopts a solution in avoidance
of Birnbaum's import by construing the plaintiff to be a purchaser or
seller within the meaning of that concept. The causation approach,
found primarily in suits for equitable relief, permits standing to sue
where the plaintiff demonstrates a causal connection between the
fraudulent sale of a security ,and injury to himself. The purpose ap-
proach looks to the interests sought to be protected by the enactment
of -the statute and the promulgation of the rule. Regardless of the
1975
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approach adopted, all share a common result: every circuit which has
considered the question has, at one time or another, managed to find
standing for a plaintiff that would otherwise have been without a fed-
eral remedy under a strict interpretation of the Birnbaum rule. This
very achievement is the strongest argument of all for the semantic-
ally straightforward approach of Eason v. GMAC.
The policy considerations proffered in support of retention of the
Birnbaum limitation do not withstand careful analysis. The conten-
tion that removal of the purchaser-seller limitation would cause a flood
of litigation is speculative. The number of plaintiffs may not materi-
ally differ from those now litigating in the hope of persuading the
courts to construe the limitation broadly. Also, if Congress' purpose
was to provide investors who suffer from fraud with a remedy, then
the fears of the courts as to the number of potential litigants should
not be permitted to thwart that congressional intent.
The argument that Birnbaum should be retained to preserve consis-
tency in interpretation of securities legislation is illusory. The courts
have shown a willingness to alter their views on other similar securities
matters. In addition, the change sought here would not produce a
drastic difference of result from what currently exists, but primarily a
difference of rationale.
The policy contention that overruling Birnbaum would promote the
further expansion of federal corporate law, assumes that such expan-
sion is undesirable. The failure of the states to provide an adequate
remedy for defrauded shareholders where, under our system of justice,
an adequate remedy should lie, provides an open invitation to the
federal government to fill the void. Where a remedy is needed, its
provision is more important to society in general, than the particular
jurisdiction providing it. If state governments decide that the fed-
eral tentacles spread too far, -the states, through legislation, can pro-
vide a competing forum. Thus, from a policy standpoint, the Eason
approach appears to be a valid one if the Supreme Court is willing to
utilize it.
The initial reaction of the circuits deciding cases subsequent to
Eason, has been to reaffirm the Birnbaum limitation without discus-
sion of Eason.0 6 However, with the Supreme Court granting certiorari
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,10 7 where the validity of
106. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974); Sargent
v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. 43 U.S.LW. 3273 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974).
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the purchaser-seller requirement is directly in issue, a conclusive reso-
lution appears finally to be at hand. Manor Drugs affords the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to establish a remedy for defrauded in-
vestors against corporate manipulation which 'adversely affects their
interests, regardless of whether or not they are purchasers or sellers.
Compelling reasons for overruling the Birnbaum doctrine are found
in Young v. The Seaboard Corporation:108
There is no reasoned basis for concluding that a plaintiff's . . .
standing . . . depends upon whether retrospective injunctive re-
lief rather than damages is necessary to cure his injury. Such
a distinction is impractical and would soon be eroded ....
[Limitations of damage claims] are better resolved through an
application of the law of damages, as the Vincent court's causality
approach suggests, rather than through the erection of standing bar-
rers supposedly anchored in the statute itself but which are fre-
quently elbowed aside. In the opinion of this court, the Vin-
cent decision suggests that any person, not just one seeking
equitable relief, who shows a causal connection between the
fraudulent sale of a security and injury to himself may sue under
Rule lOb-5. 0 9
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108. 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
109. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
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